Abstract-Aggregating millions of hardware components to construct an exascale computing platform will pose significant resilience challenges. In addition to slowdowns associated with detected errors, silent errors are likely to further degrade application performance. Moreover, silent data corruption (SDC) has the potential to undermine the integrity of the results produced by important scientific applications.
I. INTRODUCTION
Current projections suggest that the risk of silent data corruption (SDC) on next-generation, extreme-scale system may be significant [1] . The frequency of SDC events is highly dependent on the error detection capabilities of the errorcorrecting codes (ECC) used to protect memory. The memory of current machines is commonly protected with powerful ECCs (e.g., chipkill-correct [2] ). However, given concerns about power consumption on next-generation machines and the emergence of novel memory devices, e.g., high-bandwidth memory (HBM), it is not clear whether chipkill-correct algorithms will continue to be viable, cf. [3] . Using less protective algorithms has the potential to increase the rate of SDC events, cf. [4] . Moreover, silent data corruption (SDC) has the potential to undermine the integrity of the results produced by important scientific applications.
In this work, we introduce a lightweight, applicationindependent mechanism that efficiently detects and corrects Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology and Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC., a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International, Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energys National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525. SDC in read-mostly and infrequently-accessed memory. This technique also has the ability to cooperate with the protected application to further reduce overheads. We focus on readmostly memory because SDC events are more innocuous in frequently-written memory; write operations have the potential to overwrite corrupted memory values before they are ingested by the application.
SDC may be a larger problem in memory that is infrequently accessed. HPC systems commonly deploy ECCs to protect against memory errors. On read accesses the memory controller repairs any correctable errors (CE) that have occurred. However, if memory is infrequently accessed, it is possible for CEs to accumulate until they exceed the detection capabilities of the ECC. Due to bit interleaving 1 on modern memory devices, it is unlikely that memory corruption will affect adjacent bits in a single cache line. But if relatively long periods of time elapse between accesses, multiple corruption events may collectively flip more bits in a cache line than the hardware protection mechanisms are capable of detecting.
Domain scientists rely on the integrity of their simulation results. SDC jeopardizes the validity of the conclusions they draw from their output data. As a result, ensuring the integrity of memory contents is of paramount importance for meaningful computational science on our most powerful systems.
Many existing techniques for ensuring the algorithmic integrity of computation (e.g., redundant instruction execution, redundant data structures) focus on protecting computation (i.e., the contents of write-mostly memory). In contrast, our proposed approach protects read-mostly memory (e.g., input data and other constants) from corruption that cannot be detected by existing hardware mechanisms. 2 To protect against SDC we use memory protection mechanisms to maintain compressed backups of pages of application memory. We detect SDC by identifying changes in memory contents that occur without explicit writes. In this paper, we provide a detailed description of our approach. We demonstrate that, for several applications, our approach can potentially protect a significant fraction of application memory pages from SDC. Additionally, our technique is complementary and can be combined with many other approaches to provide a significant bulwark against SDC. The contributions of this paper include:
• a detailed description of an approach to using hashing and lightweight compression to detect and correct memory errors due to SDC; and • an examination of how important HPC workloads access the contents of their allocated memory.
II. BACKGROUND
The definition of SDC is a matter of debate, cf. [5] . In particular, it is not uncommon to define SDC in terms of observable application behavior, e.g., corruption that causes the application's output to violate an application-specific correctness check. However, for the purposes of our analysis, we interpret SDC broadly. Specifically, we assume that SDC is: any change in the contents of application memory that is not due to an explicit write and is not otherwise detected by hardware mechanisms (e.g., ECC).
Very little empirical data on the occurrence of SDC is publicly available. However, given our definition of SDC, we assume that memory is protected by hardware mechanisms that detect and/or correct any errors that affect a small number of bits within a cache line. SDC events occur when the number of corrupted bits exceeds the detection capabilities of the hardware mechanism. As a result, we expect that each SDC event will affect multiple bits within a single cache line.
III. APPROACH

A. Tracking Application Memory
Our approach to tracking application memory is based on libmemprotect [6] . We track allocations of application memory by using the GNU linker to intercept calls to standard C/C++ memory allocators (e.g., malloc).
Detecting SDC requires that we distinguish between changes to memory contents that are due to explicit writes and those that are not. We leverage the page protection mechanisms (e.g., mprotect) provided by the Linux kernel for this purpose. Although we need to track both read and write accesses, there are not straightforward or portable ways to distinguish between page faults that result from read accesses and those that result from write accesses. Additionally, on many systems write-access implies read-access (i.e., it is not possible to grant write-only access). Therefore, we remove read and write privileges (PROT_NONE) from all allocation memory pages. On the application's first access to a memory page, our signal signal handler restores read access (PROT_READ) to the target page. On the second access to a memory page, our signal handler restores write privileges (PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE). As a result, if the first access to a memory page is a write, it will generate two consecutive page faults before it succeeds.
Manipulating the page protections in this way allows us to track the state of the application's memory.
Although our approach is designed to protect read-mostly memory, our initial proposal is naive; we use page protection mechanisms to track accesses of all application memory pages. Because an application's page accesses may change over time, we periodically re-remove access permissions for the application's memory. The period between removing access permissions is the protection interval. For the data presented in this paper, we use a protection interval of 60 seconds.
B. Handling System Calls
When memory with insufficient privileges is accessed within a system call, the SIGSEGV signal is not generated and our user-level signal handler is unable to restore access privileges. For the applications that we consider in this paper, we used ptrace to verify that memory with limited access permissions is not passed to system calls.
Because of optimizations like zero-copy networking, a similar issue exists with memory buffers passed to MPI. Our library uses the MPI profiling layer to intercept all MPI calls and ensures that all memory passed to MPI has read and write permissions. Moreover, because there is not always a straightforward way to determine when memory is no longer being used by MPI our library stops tracking all message buffer memory passed to MPI. For the applications that we consider in this paper, the amount of memory that is untracked is small: less than 3% in most cases.
C. Protecting Application Data
Our approach protects application data using two principal mechanisms: hashing and compression. At the beginning of each protection interval, we store a compressed backup and hash the contents of each page of application memory. To ensure the integrity of the compressed backups, we also compute the hash of each compressed backup.
D. Protecting Metadata
Our approach requires us to make strong guarantees about the integrity of the internal data structures that we use to track pages of application memory. Our metadata includes information about the application's memory allocations, status information about each memory page (e.g., current hash value), and information for managing compressed backups.
To ensure the integrity of its metadata, our library validates the hash value of each metadata structure on read access. After each write access, the hash value is recomputed. If the hash values computed do not match, then our metadata has been corrupted. Corrupted metadata means that we no longer have a reliable way to assure the integrity of the application's memory. The safest course of action in this circumstance is to restart the application from a known good checkpoint.
E. Detecting & Correcting SDC
The principal mechanism that we use to detect SDC is hash comparison. We maintain hash values of all of the key data structures. Assuming memory corruption does not occur adversarially (i.e., the process that leads to memory corruption is not actively attempting to avoid detection), the probability of undetectable memory corruption is small; for cryptographic hash functions, the probability is vanishingly small.
At the end of each protection interval, our library recomputes the hash value of each page of application memory that the CPU has not explicitly written to. It then compares the new hash value to the stored value. Four outcomes are possible. Application memory hash valid AND Backup hash valid With high probability, neither the application memory page nor its backup was corrupted during this protection interval and the application can safely continue execution. Application memory hash valid AND Backup hash mismatch The compressed backup and/or its hash value has been corrupted. We re-compress the application memory page and re-compute its hash value. The application memory was not corrupted, so the application can safely continue to execute. Application memory hash mismatch AND Backup hash valid The application memory and/or its hash value has been corrupted. Because the compressed backup was not corrupted, our library can reconstruct the contents of the application memory page. Initially, our library reconstructs the application memory page in a separate region of memory allocated for this purpose. By comparing the contents of the reconstructed page to the current contents of the page, we can determine whether the application memory or its hash was corrupted. If they match, then we know that only the hash value of the application memory pages was corrupted. If they do not, then we know that the application memory page was corrupted.
If the corrupted memory page has not been read in the last protection interval, then we can use the reconstructed page to repair the corruption in the application memory page. If the corrupted memory page has been read, then we cannot safely repair the application memory page because it is possible that its erroneous contents have been ingested by the application and have corrupted its state. Application memory hash mismatch AND Backup hash mismatch Corruption has occurred in: (i) the application memory and/or its hash value; and (ii) the compressed backup and/or its hash value. Because we have no reliable to way of mitigating (or even identifying) the corruption, the only safe response is to restart the application. However, because each of these elements are stored in separate memory allocations, the probability of this kind of corruption within a single protection interval (e.g., corruption of a page of application memory and corruption of its compressed backup in close temporal proximity) is very small.
IV. EVALUATING APPLICATION BEHAVIOR
In this section, we evaluate the memory use of several applications and examine implications for our proposed approach. We considered six workloads. These workloads, described in For all of these workloads, our experiments were performed using two Linux Infiniband clusters. We ran each of the workloads on 128 MPI processes on 16 nodes. We repeated each experiment five times. Fig. 1 shows the fraction of application memory pages that are unmodified within a protection interval. Each bar is divided into three colored regions indicating three types of unmodified pages: (i) PROT_NONE, pages that have not been accessed during the protection interval; (ii) PROT_READ, pages that have been read from but not written to during the protection interval; and (iii) PROT_WRITE, pages that have been written to, but whose contents are the same at the end of the interval as they were at the beginning.
The data in this figure demonstrate memory modification behavior is highly application-dependent. We observe that for three of the workloads-HPCCG, CTH-st, and LULESH-the aggregate fraction of memory pages (i.e., across all categories of unmodified pages) that are unmodified within a protection interval is significant, more than 70%. For the other three workloads, the aggregate fraction is more modest: 22% for LAMMPS-lj, 24% for LAMMPS-eam, and 11% for SAMRAI.
Each category of unmodified pages has different implications. For pages that are not accessed during a protection interval (PROT_NONE), we can straightforwardly detect and correct SDC events. Pages in this category are relatively prevalent in four of our workloads: LAMMPS-lj (8.3%), LAMMPS-eam (7.6%), HPCCG (7.6%), and CTH (15.7%). Few pages in this category were observed in the memory of Application Description HPCCG A Mantevo mini-application [7] designed to mimic finite element generation, assembly and solution for an unstructured grid problem.
LAMMPS
A classical molecular dynamics simulator from Sandia National Laboratories [8] . The data presented in this paper are from experiments that use the Lennard-Jones (LAMMPS-lj) and Embedded Atom Model (LAMMPS-eam) potentials included in the LAMMPS distribution.
CTH A multi-material, large deformation, strong shock wave, solid mechanics code [9] . The data presented in this paper are from experiments that use an input that describes the simulation of the detonation of a conical explosive charge (CTH-st).
LULESH A proxy application that approximates the hydrodynamics equations discretely by partitioning the spatial problem domain into a collection of volumetric elements defined by a mesh [10] .
SAMRAI A framework that is designed to enable the application of structured adaptive mesh refinement to large-scale multi-physics problems [11] LULESH and almost none in the memory of SAMRAI.
For pages that are read from but not written to during a protection interval (PROT_READ), our approach can detect SDC. However, in this case correcting SDC requires cooperation with the application because it is possible that the application has ingested corrupted data. By providing the memory address where the corruption occurred and the time interval in which the corruption occurred, the application can determine whether it is safe to continue execution. For example, some iterative algorithms are able to guarantee convergence if corruption can be confined to particular data structures [12] , [13] . The data in Fig. 1 show that a large fraction (84%) of the memory of HPCCG falls into this category. Pages in this category are also common in LAMMPS-lj, LAMMPS-eam, and LULESH. Almost none of the pages in the memory of SAMRAI or CTHst belong to this category.
SDC events that occur on pages that have been written to, but not modified (PROT_WRITE(unmodified)) represent additional potential for this approach. Because the contents of these pages are not changing rapidly, we may be able to use more frequent removal of write privileges to transform them to one of the other categories (i.e., PROT_NONE or PROT_READ). It may also be possible to reduce (or eliminate) writes by the application that do not modify the contents of the underlying memory (e.g., with specialized compiler extensions). The data in Fig. 1 show that for two of our applications-CTH-st and LULESH-a large fraction of pages fall into this category. We also observe that almost all of SAM-RAI's unmodified memory falls into this category. A relatively small fraction of the memory of LAMMPS-lj, LAMMPS-eam, and HPCCG belong to this category. These data demonstrate that developing techniques to detect and correct SDC for pages in this category could significantly increase the impact of the approach.
V. RELATED WORK
Concern about SDC in extreme-scale HPC systems has led to significant research into detection and correction methods. Algorithm-based fault tolerance exploits algorithm-specific properties to ensure that the application generates correct output even when memory contents are corrupted. Common approaches include: augmenting computational operations (e.g., matrix-matrix multiplication) to ensure that they can withstand SDC [14] - [18] , exploiting physical properties of the simulation [19] - [21] , and identifying simulation variables that change in unexpected ways [22] , [23] . Although these approaches can provide protection with low runtime overhead, each solution is only applicable to one (or a small set of) computational algorithm. Furthermore, in many cases, these algorithms only protect certain phases of the application's execution (e.g., certain mathematical kernels).
Replication-based methods duplicate (or triplicate) computation, see e.g., [24] - [27] . By comparing the results of each replica, these approaches provide strong guarantees of system integrity. However, the large number of additional resources that are required to perform the replicated computation is a significant drawback.
Runtime-based methods periodically interrupt the application to check the integrity of its data. Flipsphere [28] uses a software-based ECC methods to detect and correct SDC. In some cases, the runtime overhead of Flipsphere is significant because it must intercept large numbers of read and write operations to verify data integrity. Most closely related, Levy et al. [6] use lightweight compression and hashing to correct hardware-detected errors in memory. This approach is limited to detectable, uncorrectable errors (DUE) in memory; it is unable to detect or correct SDC.
The approach that we propose in this paper can be used in conjunction with existing approaches to further ensure the integrity of the application. Our approach is also applicationindependent and does not require detailed knowledge about the semantics of the application's memory. Similarly, it works with existing, unmodified application codes. Additionally, unlike Flipsphere, our approach is able to distinguish between corruption of metadata and corruption of application memory.
VI. CONCLUSION
Silent data corruption has the potential to undermine the integrity of the results produced by important scientific applications on next-generation systems. In this paper, we introduced an application-independent mechanism which uses hashing and compression to detect and correct memory errors due to SDC. Using a diverse set of important parallel workloads, we examined these applications' memory access patterns and demonstrated that for several applications a significant portion of their memory is read-mostly and therefore amenable to our approach.
